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Abstract—The problem of detecting anomalies in time series
from network measurements has been widely studied and is
a topic of fundamental importance. Many anomaly detection
methods are based on packet inspection collected at the network
core routers, with consequent disadvantages in terms of com-
putational cost and privacy. We propose an alternative method
in which packet header inspection is not needed. The method
is based on the extraction of a normal subspace obtained by
the tensor decomposition technique considering the correlation
between different metrics. We propose a new approach for online
tensor decomposition where changes in the normal subspace can
be tracked efficiently. Another advantage of our proposal is the
interpretability of the obtained models. The flexibility of the
method is illustrated by applying it to two distinct examples,
both using actual data collected on residential routers.
Index Terms—network measurement and analysis, machine
Learning for networks, DDoS detection, tensor decomposition
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of detecting anomalous events in computer
networks has been widely studied due to its relevance to
network operation. However, these events are in general very
hard to identify [1]. The problem is challenging due to the
wide variety of anomalies, low frequency of occurrences,
and the definition of what is considered “expected behav-
ior”. An application example among the countless existing
ones is detecting occasional changes in traffic patterns on
a communication channel caused by a distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attack. DDoS attacks represent a major threat
to proper network operation, wasting resources and creating
network outages. For instance, DDoS attacks targeted Amazon
Web Services in October 2019 and were able to disrupt
different services [2].
In general, anomaly detection is based on the analysis of
packet headers at the core of the network, with potentially
high computational cost and possible privacy issues. Our
methodology differs from others in that it does not use packet
headers; it is based on distributed data collection at home
routers, and uses only a small amount of information.
The methodology is founded on tensor decomposition to
detect and diagnose anomalous events using multivariate time
series. The approach was evaluated using time series obtained
from measurements collected at home routers of a medium-
sized ISP. Tensor decomposition allows the extraction of
normal patterns from the metrics considered, during different
time intervals, and the identification of latent relationships
between them. We also devise a new online tensor decompo-
sition method that can efficiently track changes in the normal
subspace. The reported results show the effectiveness of the
method to detect anomalies in two different scenarios used as
examples. Nevertheless, we emphasize that the methodology
is general and can be employed in other scenarios.
This work shares similarities with [3], [4], where a normal
subspace is defined by applying PCA and model residuals
are used to detect anomalies in a network. In this work,
extraction of the normal subspace is performed using the
PARAFAC model [5], which naturally allows the decompo-
sition of multidimensional data and preserves relationships
among the metrics under evaluation.
The DDoS attack detection problem is the first example
considered. Based on observations of byte and packet up-
load/download counters which are non-intrusive and requires
no packet inspection, we show that the proposed method can
accurately detect attacks in both offline and online scenarios.
Using only measurements collected from home routers, the
problem of identifying time intervals within which perfor-
mance degradation occurs constitutes the second example.
(Performance degradation is the anomaly in this case.) The
process can be easily automated to identify and locate such
anomalies and analyze the quality of service in different parts
of an ISP’s topology.
Contributions. Key contributions are summarized below:
• Tensor decomposition to detect network anomalies. Our
framework is based on tensor decomposition. We show that
the PARAFAC model provides an interpretable and efficient
way to extract expected normal behavior, taking into account
the correlations among different metrics.
• New online tensor decomposition method. Our method is
based on a tensor window [6]. The results show the good
accuracy and efficiency of the approach.
• Use of real data collected at home routers. We use time
series obtained from real network measurements collected
at home routers to evaluate the framework. Our method is
capable of detecting different types of anomalies based on
simple metrics and without compromising users’ privacy.
• Use in different scenarios. The two application examples use
different input metrics.
Related work is presented in Section II. The tensor de-
composition technique is discussed in Section III. Section IV
describes the proposed framework for anomaly detection and
we explain how the residuals are extracted in both offline and
online scenarios in Section V. The DDoS attack detection ex-
ample application is presented in Section VI, and Section VII
describes the second application example in which network
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performance degradation intervals are detected. Section VIII
concludes our work.
II. RELATED WORK
Anomaly detection methods are based on models that cap-
ture the normal behaviour of the network [7]. Most of the
work in the literature of network anomaly detection is based on
packet inspection at the core of the network [3], [4], [8]–[10],
which requires processing privacy-sensitive information from
packet headers, such as traffic volume between source and
destination IPs and port number. Recent work also employs
packet inspection, but at home routers [11]. Our work uses
measurements performed by home routers without packet
inspection, providing a simple, efficient and privacy-preserving
strategy.
Previous work by our group has also made use of mea-
surements on home routers without packet inspection [12].
Mendonc¸a et al. [12] focus on DDoS attacks that are detected
with high accuracy using only simple statistics from byte and
packet counters obtained in a time window. The current work
uses another method (tensor decomposition) and we show
that it can be used to detect different types of anomalies. In
addition, the results of our approach are easier to interpret,
since PARAFAC produces interpretable models [5], and we
are able to infer the normal daily behavior of a user, one of
the main challenges in anomaly detection [1].
Other previous works in the literature use subspace extrac-
tion methods (like PARAFAC) to detect network anomalies. As
an example, Maruhashi et al. [8] identify suspicious activities
on the network (such as port scanning and spreading of worms)
by searching for abnormal subgraphs from the discovered pat-
terns returned by a tensor model (PARAFAC). Their method is
heavily dependent on a manual choice of the patterns deemed
interesting. In addition, [8] uses packet inspection, considering
a dataset with the format (source IP × destination IP ×
timestamp or port number). This data structure is commonly
used for network analysis with tensor models based on packet
inspection. In contrast, our work does not use data extracted
from packet headers and consider tensors with the format (user
× network metrics × timestamp).
In the works of Lakhina et al. [3], [4], the authors ap-
ply PCA to define the normal subspace. Particularly, in [4]
anomalies that span multiple traffic features (metrics) are
detected, similar to our work. However, PCA is a matrix-
based model and, unlike tensor-based models like PARAFAC,
it requires multidimensional data to be unfolded [13] into
a single, large matrix before its application. The PARAFAC
model, on the other hand, reveals the relationship between
different metrics in multidimensional data, making it more
robust to noise. It also has the property of uniqueness, in
contrast to PCA, where its inherent rotational freedom [5] can
lead to distinct interpretations concerning the structure of the
normal subspace.
Xie et al. [9] proposes an anomaly detection method using
a modified PARAFAC model that accounts for nonlinear data
features. The proposed algorithm considers the similarity of
tensor slices in each mode during the training process. In addi-
tion, residual anomalies are associated with a sparse tensor and
are isolated during the optimization process. Kasai et al. [14]
also proposes a sparse tensor to account for abnormal flows.
However, both works ignore the interpretability of the model
and evaluate the method using only artificially generated attack
data taken from arbitrary probability distributions, while we
consider: (i) attack traffic generated by real malware and (ii)
real performance degradation events.
We propose an online tensor decomposition approach based
on the sliding window method of Sun et al. [6]. Our solution
has a lower computational cost while mantaining a good
performance for anomaly detection. Kasai et al. [14] also con-
siders a tensor-based online algorithm. Similar to our online
algorithm, Kasai et al. [14] uses the concept of sliding window
and modifies the PARAFAC decomposition to deal with time
and space complexities required for online approaches. Other
works also modify the PARAFAC decomposition for online
application, but without the use of windows [15], [16]. We
focus on a simpler online solution, with a slight adaptation in
PARAFAC decomposition. In our approach the anomalies are
detected by classifying or clustering the residuals obtained by
tensor decomposition.
III. TENSOR DECOMPOSITION
In this section we briefly present a theoretical basis on tensor
decomposition and describe our notation. For details we refer
to [13]. A tensor is a multidimensional matrix denoted by X .
We usually refer to the dimensions of X as modes. A third-
order tensor X ∈ RI×J×K can be represented by a sum of
three-way outer products [13] as follows,
X =M+ E , ar ∈ RI ,br ∈ RJ , cr ∈ RK (1)
Mi,j,k =
R∑
r=1
ar,ibr,jcr,k, (2)
where E is the residual tensor and R is the number of factors.
The factor matrices (or loadings) define model M: A =
[a1,a2, . . . ,aR] ∈ RI×R, B = [b1,b2, . . . ,bR] ∈ RJ×R,
C = [c1, c2, . . . , cR] ∈ RK×R. Following standard notation,
we also let ar = A:,r, for 1 ≤ r ≤ R, and a(i) = Ai,:, for
1 ≤ i ≤ I .
The PARAFAC decomposition is obtained by minimizing
the sum of squares of the residuals, i.e., the difference between
X andM. Such difference is a nonconvex function; however,
if we fix two of the factor matrices, the problem is reduced to a
linear least squares regression for the third matrix. This is the
basis of the Alternating Least Squares (ALS) procedure [5].
ALS estimates the factor matrices one at a time, keeping the
others fixed. The process iterates until a convergence criterion
is satisfied or there is no change in estimates.
In this work we use the method of Split-Half Validation
(SV) [17] in combination with Tucker Congruence Coefficient
(TCC) [18] to estimate R and evaluate whether the solution
is unique and generalizable.
IV. FRAMEWORK
The proposed methodology consists of the following steps:
1) Preprocessing: In the first step we perform data trans-
formations needed to apply tensor decomposition, such as data
scaling and filtering.
2) Tensor Decomposition: In this step we apply tensor
decomposition to extract the normal subspace. We use the
PARAFAC method due to the uniqueness of its solution and
its capacity to deal with multivariate data [5].
3) Residual extraction: The model obtained by tensor
decomposition is used to extract the residuals and perform
anomaly detection. The idea is that anomalies are not well
modeled by the normal subspace, allowing the separation
between normal and anomalous behavior through residual
analysis.
4) Anomaly classification/clustering: The final step varies
depending on the application considered. When the dataset
contains labeled anomalies, we perform a supervised clas-
sification. On the other hand, there are applications where
the labels for anomalies are unknown or hard to obtain. For
these cases, we consider an unsupervised approach based on
clustering.
V. RESIDUAL EXTRACTION
Our anomaly detection technique is based on analyzing
the PARAFAC residuals [5]. Normal behavior is captured
(modeled) by tensor decomposition and anomalies are detected
by investigating deviations from the modeled patterns.
A. Offline residual extraction
User data generally exhibits strong daily patterns over time.
This leads us to split observations from users into independent
daily series. We denote each of these series as a User-Day pair,
or UD pair.
Let I denote the number of UD pairs in our dataset. We con-
sider as inputs three-way tensors with modes UD pair (factor
matrix A), metrics of interest (factor matrix B) and time (fac-
tor matrix C), denoted by indices i, j and k, respectively.
Let Xi,:,: be the i-th horizontal slice of tensor X , i.e., Xi,:,:
is a two-dimensional matrix obtained by fixing the UD pair
mode at value i [13]. Then, for each UDi with measurements
Xi,:,: ∈ R1×J×K , we obtain a model Mi,:,: ∈ R1×J×K using
PARAFAC ALS procedure. Residuals are measured as the
difference between the model estimates and the input dataset
Ei,:,: = Xi,:,: −Mi,:,:, where Ei,:,: ∈ R1×J×K . As a UD refers
to a day and our dataset consists of time series of one-minute
bins, K = 1440.
Next, we determine the residuals corresponding to mea-
surements from new UDs that were not previously used to
parametrize model M. Let X˜κ,:,: denote the measurements
corresponding to a new UDκ. We use factor matrices B and
C from the previously trained model M (eq. (2)) and the
new measurements X˜κ,:,: to obtain vector a˜(κ) ∈ R1×R.
Factor matrices A˜, B and C produce model M˜κ,:,:, with
corresponding error E˜κ,:,:, where A˜κ,: = a˜(κ). Vector a˜(κ) is
chosen to minimize quadratic error between model estimates
and measurements. Let X˜κ,:,:(1) be the matrix unfolding of
tensor X˜κ,:,: in its first mode [13], where X˜κ,:,:(1) ∈ R1×JK .
Then,
M˜κ,:,: = X˜κ,:,: − E˜κ,:,:⇒a˜(κ)(C B)T = X˜κ,:,:(1) − E˜κ,:,:(1)
⇒a˜(κ) = X˜κ,:,:(1)((C B)T )†, (3)
where C  B denotes the Khatri-Rao product [13] between
matrices C and B and M† denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudo-
inverse of matrix M [13]. Note that both (C B) ∈ RJK×R
and ((C  B)T )† ∈ RJK×R. As vector a˜(κ) minimizes the
quadratic error, the corresponding error E˜κ,:,:(1) is orthogonal
to ((C  B)T )† which implies (3). Thus, the residuals of
UDκ are obtained by E˜κ,:,: = X˜κ,:,: − M˜κ,:,:, where model
M˜κ,:,: ∈ R1×J×K contains the new factor vector a˜(κ).
Note that the measurements corresponding to UD pairs are
available by the end of a day, and residuals must be computed
at that time. In addition, as network conditions may change
over time, it is necessary to periodically check if M is still a
good model (e.g., using Split-Half validation [17]). Otherwise,
M must be retrained to compute residuals for new UD pairs.
B. Online residual extraction
The online method tracks changes in the data by continu-
ously recomputing the model using PARAFAC. In the online
scenario, time is divided into one minute slots and new data
from all home routers is processed at every slot. The online
decomposition considers USERS instead of UD pairs as one
of the tensor modes, and obtains a three-way tensor with
modes user (mode A), the metric of interest (mode B), and
time (mode C). As soon as a new data stream arrives (every
minute), the model is updated and residuals are extracted.
We consider two different online residual extraction
schemes. First, we describe Full Window Optimization
(FWO) [6]. Then, we propose Partial Window Optimization
(PWO), a simpler and more efficient FWO variant. Figure 1
illustrates the difference between the methods, as discussed
below. Note that both schemes allow the expansion of modes
A and B throughout online decomposition, in case new users
are added or new metrics of interest are collected, respectively.
In the offline model we denote byM (resp., M˜) the model ob-
tained before (resp., after) collecting additional measurements.
In the online model variable t already subsumes the number
of collected samples, so we drop tilde from all variables.
W
(a) FWO
W
(b) PWO
Fig. 1. Online tensor decomposition approaches (W = 4). Red time slots
are used to compute factor matrices A, B and C. Blue time slots are used to
compute factor matrices A and B.
1) Full Window Optimization (FWO) [6]: A simple ap-
proach to online tensor decomposition is based on a tensor
window [6] X (t,W ) ∈ RI×J×W over the time mode (mode
C), where W refers to the window size. At every minute t
the window slides and a new tensor is formed by combining
the W − 1 previous slices {X:,:,t−W+1, ...,X:,:,t−1} and the
newly obtained data stream X:,:,t ∈ RI×J×1, representing a
new lateral slice. Since our network data presents strong daily
patterns and we consider minute time slots, we define the
window size W = 1440.
To obtain models in FWO we use the same optimization
method applied in the offline scenario for each sliding window.
Namely, for each window we compute a PARAFAC model
M(t,W ) ∈ RI×J×W using X (t,W ) ∈ RI×J×W as input for
the PARAFAC ALS algorithm. Residuals are measured as
the difference between the model and the input dataset
E(t,W ) = X (t,W )−M(t,W ). Usually we are interested in
analyzing the behavior of the most recent sample. Therefore,
we consider the residuals of the last minute t, E:,:,t ∈ RI×J×1.
A good initialization for the optimization algorithm can
reduce the number of iterations needed to converge [6].
Therefore, to speed up convergence, after we move the window
forward, we initialize the ALS algorithm with the previous
model estimates, i.e., M(t − 1,W ) with factor matrices
A(t− 1) ∈ RI×R, B(t− 1) ∈ RJ×R and C(t− 1) ∈ RW×R.
FWO requires the computation of a whole new PARAFAC
model at every window. As such, it may not be suitable for
online applications, often requiring a high and variable number
of iterations [15]. Our results indicate that this method is
computationally expensive to be used online for our appli-
cation (see Figure 4). Hence, we propose a variation of this
method to decrease computational cost while maintaining good
performance.
2) Partial Window Optimization (PWO): In order to reduce
the run time we propose a modification to FWO to obtain
modelM(t,W ) as follows. Consider the factor matrix related
to the time mode C(t) ∈ RW×R used to model the tensor
window X (t,W ). To obtain C(t) we keep the previous W −1
known loadings {c(t−W+1), ..., c(t−1)} fixed and compute
the time mode loadings related to the last sample, i.e., we
compute c(t). The other factor matrices A(t) and B(t) are
fully recomputed based on the tensor window X (t,W ).
Let X:,:,t denote the measurements of a newly obtained
data stream at time t. The model is estimated by updating
the unknown variables (A(t), B(t) and c(t), see Figure 1(b))
alternately and iteratively, until a convergence criterion is
satisfied or there is no change in estimates (Algorithm 1).
As in the ALS algorithm, matrices A(t) and B(t) and vector
c(t) are calculated by minimizing the quadratic error between
model estimates and measurements. The sequence of updates
is given by lines 4-7 in Algorithm 1.
1 A(t)← A(t− 1), B(t)← B(t− 1)
2 C(t)← [c(t−W + 1)T , . . . , c(t− 1)T , c(t−W )T ]T
3 while not converged do
4 c(t)← X:,:,t(3)((B(t)A(t))T )†
5 C(t)W,: ← c(t)
6 A(t)← X(1)((C(t)B(t))T )†
7 B(t)← X(2)((C(t)A(t))T )†
8 end
9 return A(t), B(t), c(t)
Algorithm 1: Online algorithm
TABLE I
TYPES OF DDOS ATTACKS EVALUATED
Malware Attack type (payload size)
Mirai UDP flood (1400B)
Mirai TCP SYN flood (0B)
Mirai TCP ACK flood (0B)
Mirai UDP PLAIN flood (1400B)
BASHLITE UDP flood (1400B)
BASHLITE TCP SYN flood (0B)
BASHLITE TCP ACK flood (0B)
In Algorithm 1, X(1) and X(2) are the tensor unfoldings
of X in its first and second modes, respectively, X(1) ∈
RI×JK , X(2) ∈ RJ×IK . Note that c(t) ∈ R1×R, A(t) ∈
RI×R and B(t) ∈ RJ×R. As with the FWO scheme,
the factor matrices of model M(t,W ) are initialized with
the model estimates M(t − 1,W ) obtained for the pre-
vious window. The residuals related to t are obtained by
E(t,W ):,:,t = X (t,W ):,:,t −M(t,W ):,:,t.
VI. APPLICATION I: DDOS ATTACK DETECTION
We apply our framework to detect DDoS attacks originated
from home devices. We consider a dataset with different
types of attack vectors (see Table I) obtained by combining
home users traffic and attack traffic measured in laboratory
experiments using real malware code. Then, we apply a
supervised approach to detect when an attack is underway.
A. Preprocessing
We collect upload and download byte and packet rates
per user in a given day (i.e., UD pair), where measurements
are performed every minute. From these data we obtain the
multivariate time series used as input to the tensor decompo-
sition method. We consider 18722 time series from 812 users
between 19-August-2019 and 22-September-2019.
We obtain our attack dataset using the approach proposed
in [12]. A brief description of the methodology follows. First,
we randomly choose a fraction of infected homes q = 0.05
that participate in synchronized DDoS attacks, where q is
chosen based on the fraction of users affected by a real
attack [19]. Next, we define the attack type (Table I) uniformly
at random. The majority of attacks have a duration of a few
minutes [20]. Therefore, we consider attacks whose duration
follows a Gaussian distribution with mean µ = 2 minutes.
We then sample time slots where the synchronized attacks
start using a uniform distribution with one attack per day on
average. Finally, we add the attack traffic to the measured
traffic of the infected homes. Preliminarily analysis were made
with more attacks per day and with the same fraction of
infected homes. The achieved results present similar detection
performance (not shown).
We split our dataset into three different sets. The first set
(Tr1) contains the first week of the dataset and is used to
extract the normal subspace. We use a second set (Tr2) with the
following 19 days to fit an anomaly classifier using residuals
extracted from the tensor model. A third set (Te) with the
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Fig. 2. Offline: Factors obtained by PARAFAC.
last 9 days of the dataset is used to evaluate the classifier
performance.
In a real-world scenario, it is often difficult to define
precisely whether a traffic dataset hides embedded network
anomalies, especially in the case of malicious anomalies [4].
Therefore, to evaluate the robustness of our method we con-
sider that the whole dataset, including the training set Tr1 used
to obtain the normal subspace before residual extraction, has
some infected users. The idea is to consider a more realistic
scenario, where some hidden anomalies might be present.
Before applying tensor decomposition, we convert our data
to logarithmic scale. Then, we apply Min-Max normalization
on each traffic metric, where the minimum and maximum
values are taken from the training set Tr1 and applied to the
entire dataset. By keeping traffic metrics on a similar scale,
we capture the correlations between them and ensure that they
have the same impact on the optimization process.
B. Tensor decomposition
We consider different tensor structures for offline and online
scenarios. In the offline approach our tensor is composed of
three modes: (UD × traffic metric × minute). We get model
M ∈ R3412×4×1440 from the training set Tr1 with a total
number of UDs equal to 3412. The application of Split-Half
Validation validates up to R = 6 factors. (Except otherwise
noted, we use R = 6.) In the online approach we consider
as modes (user × traffic metrics × minute), so the models
M(t,W ) ∈ R812×4×1440 are obtained with a window size
W = 1440 over the whole dataset, that has a total of 812 users.
We consider four metrics: download and upload bytes/packets
at every minute by home users.
We analyze the factors obtained in the offline scenario
(model M) to understand the model behavior. Figures 2(a)
and 2(b) present the time mode (mode C) factors weighted
by the loadings associated with download and upload byte
rate measurements (mode B), respectively, while Figures 2(c)
and 2(d) show the factors weighted by download and upload
packet rate loadings. One factor (represented in gray) is
nearly constant throughout the day. The remaining factors
identify higher network usage at different periods of the day.
Moreover, the difference in scale between the number of bytes
downloaded and uploaded is larger than the difference for the
number of packets downloaded and uploaded. This indicates
that connections exchange a similar number of download and
upload packets, but upload packets usually carry less data.
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Fig. 3. Offline: Histograms of residuals.
C. Residual extraction
We extract residuals for sets Tr2 and Te using the residual
extraction techniques described in Section V. These resid-
uals consist of all traffic metrics for each minute and for
each UD/user (offline/online) and are used as inputs to the
classifiers. The relationship between upload and download
traffic can also be an important feature to detect attacks [12].
Therefore, we also consider two more features that express
the residual difference between upload and download pack-
ets and bytes, totaling six features: (i) download bytes, (ii)
upload bytes, (iii) download packets, (iv) upload packets,
(v) difference between upload and download bytes and (vi)
difference between upload and download packets. Figures 3(a)
and 3(b) present the histograms of the residuals E˜ retrieved
from the offline method for the features (iv) upload packets
and (vi) difference between upload and download packets.
The histograms show that the selected features satisfactorily
separates residuals with and without attacks.
Figure 4 shows the run time for both PWO and FWO online
methods for each minute of a day. Since FWO recomputes
all loadings of factor matrix C(t) (time) at every slide of
the window (at every minute), the time in seconds needed
to recompute M(t,W ) varies depending on data X (t,W ),
and can be large enough such as to be inadequate for an
online approach. On the other hand, PWO consistenly requires
smaller computational times than FWO.
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Fig. 4. Run time for FWO and PWO online methods.
TABLE II
RANDOM FOREST
RESULTS
Model Precision Detection
Accuracy
PARAFAC 0.9891 0.9396
PCA 0.9709 0.9121
PWO 0.9718 0.9396
PWO +
Likelihood
0.9978 0.9725
TABLE III
FEATURE IMPORTANCE OF RANDOM
FOREST
Residual Feature Gini index
Difference up and
down packets
0.5207
Up packets 0.1489
Down packets 0.1348
Difference up and
down bytes
0.1150
Down bytes 0.0450
Up bytes 0.0356
D. Anomaly classification
After extracting the residuals we train a classifier to detect
when an attack occurs. To estimate the method’s ability to
detect attacks we consider five different classifiers, leverag-
ing features extracted using PARAFAC: Logistic Regression,
Decision Tree, Random Forest, Gaussian Naive Bayes and
Multi-layer Perceptron. We select the classifier with the best
weighted F1 score in a 5-fold cross validation on the residuals
obtained from the training set Tr2. We also consider PCA
as an alternative to PARAFAC for comparison purposes. As
expected, for the five classifiers considered PARAFAC outper-
forms PCA as the latter loses structural information present in
the data after converting tensors into matrices. The Random
Forest classifier achieves better results for both methods.
Moreover, preliminary evaluations indicate that models with
two factors (R = 2) perform well. Therefore, the results in
the sequel are obtained with Random Forest and with R = 2.
Next, we train the Random Forest classifier with the residu-
als obtained from set Tr2 and we evaluate the results using the
residuals of set Te. Table II presents results for two evaluation
metrics: Detection Accuracy and Precision. Detection Accu-
racy measures the percentage of anomalies detected, defined
as ndn , where nd is the number of detected attacks, and n is the
total number of attacks in the set Te. We assume that an attack
is detected if an anomaly is identified in at least one of the
time slots that contain the traffic from that attack. Precision
is calculated as follows: TPTP+FP , where TP (True Positives) is
the time (in minutes) where an attack occurs and is detected,
while FP (False Positives) is defined as the time (in minutes)
where an attack is wrongly detected. Therefore, Precision
decreases when the number of False Positives increases. A
model with a better detection rate (higher Detection Accuracy)
is critical in scenarios where attacks have a major impact
on the network. At the same time, a lower number of false
positives (higher Precision) decreases the amount of users
incorrectly classified as attackers, reducing the chance of a user
being wrongly affected by a countermeasure. For example, a
legitimate customer might have its connection blocked if the
classifier falsely reports an attack.
We compare the performance of PARAFAC and PCA mod-
els in the offline approach. Table II shows that PARAFAC
achieves higher performance for both metrics. PARAFAC not
only detects a higher percentage of attacks but also achieves
higher precision, with a lower number of false positives.
Moreover, although not reported, our results using PARAFAC
show that all types of DDoS attacks evaluated have similar
Detection Accuracy.
To evaluate the relevance of the six features retrieved from
PARAFAC residuals we look at the Gini index-based impor-
tance metric from the Random Forest classifier, as shown in
Table III. The most important residual feature is the difference
between upload and download packets (Gini 0.5207) followed
by upload packets (Gini 0.1489) and download packets (Gini
0.1348). We evaluate the classifier using only packet-rate
based features and compare the results against those obtained
with PARAFAC for all the features. The results show that
the number of false positives is larger in the first case, with
Precision decreasing to 0.9780 using only packet features
compared against 0.9891 using all features.
Table II shows that PWO preserves the same Detection
Accuracy for online decomposition in comparison to the of-
fline method, while Precision decays from 0.9891 (PARAFAC)
to 0.9718 (PWO). A small decrease in performance is not
surprising taking into account that PWO is an online approach
where the model is constantly updated as soon as a new data
stream arrives. Nevertheless, PWO still achieves better results
for both metrics in comparison to PCA. We also consider the
time to detect an attack in the online scenario. The detection
time of the PWO model is one minute for 86.55% of the
detected attacks, while 99.41% of the attacks are detected
within two minutes. A short detection time is essential to adopt
fast countermeasures and mitigate the impact of an attack.
Figure 3 suggests that the histograms of residuals E˜ follow
a two-component mixture of Gaussians (GMM): one mixture
represents residuals when only normal traffic is present and an-
other when there are attacks. (Each GMM has six dimensions,
one per feature. Figure 3 shows two of the six dimensions.) To
leverage this observation for classification purposes, we add
two additional features to the online PWO classifier, namely
the likelihoods that residuals are generated by each GMM at
each minute. (Therefore, eight features are used in total.) The
results reported in the last line of Table II indicate that those
two additional features can significantly increase precision and
accuracy.
E. Spatio-temporal correlation
It is possible to further improve attack detection rates by
correlating the classifier results for each home, since DDoS
attacks are synchronized by nature. Mendonc¸a et al. [12]
propose a Bayesian decision problem using MAP criterion
to detect synchronized attacks with high probability. Using
the model parameterized with our results for the PWO online
method (|H| = 812, PD ≈ 0.0014, pfp ≈ 2.64 · 10−6, prc ≈
0.8266, q = 0.05) yields m0 ≈ 4.21. Therefore, the model
considers that a synchronized attack is happening if at least 5
users report an attack. The spatio-temporal correlation presents
a great performance with the probability of false alarms (Type
I error) equals 3.73 · 10−16 and the probability of missing a
synchronized attack (Type II error) equals 9.11 · 10−11.
VII. APPLICATION II: DETECTING NETWORK
DEGRADATION INTERVALS
We apply our methodology to the detection of degradation
intervals in the ISP network. In the absence of reliable labels
to identify anomalies and evaluate the results quantitatively,
we rely on unsupervised clustering over residuals extracted
by the offline method to group events with similar behavior.
An application example of the method is to automatically
identify potential network problems affecting multiple users
and to show the regions with poor performance.
A. Preprocessing
We use both latency and loss time series measured at one-
minute intervals as the main performance metrics of interest.
These metrics were collected on 2964 home routers between
19-August-2019 and 22-September-2019. Both metrics are
obtained by sending a train of 100 ICMP packets at 10
millisecond intervals to a server located in the ISP network.
Latency and loss measurements can be affected by home
network user traffic [21]. Therefore, we do not consider for
the analysis the value of minute samples whose cross-traffic
is greater than a threshold θ. Based on the users with the
lowest nominal capacity in our dataset we set this threshold
as θ = 2.5 Mbps. After filtering out cross-traffic, we only
consider time series with at least η = 1000 samples.
For some network failures, e.g. link failures, the communi-
cation between a client and the measurement server can be dis-
rupted and no measurement samples are recorded. Therefore, it
is possible to infer periods of network unavailability from the
lack of measurement samples, specially when multiple users
do not report measurement results simultaneously. Hence, we
encode every minute bins for which loss measurements are
missing as having packet loss rate equal to 1. For the analysis,
we remove samples with cross-traffic above the threshold θ
and periods when the measurement server is offline. This
introduces missing samples that PARAFAC can easily handle.
Finally, we use the log of each sample as input for the tensor
decomposition. We considered 50282 multivariate time series
with latency and loss values of one-minute granularity.
B. Tensor decomposition and residual extraction
We model the measurement data as a tensor with three
modes: (UD × network metric × minute). Since we use daily
time series of latency/loss measurements as inputs, we get a
third-order tensor X ∈ R50282×2×1440. We use the Split-Half
Validation method to set the number of factors R = 4.
We use metrics obtained from three different residual time
series: latency residuals, loss residuals in which samples with
packet loss fraction equal to 1 are removed and loss residuals
that includes all samples. Each metric can be used to detect a
different type of anomaly, such as network congestion and
link or equipment failures. We extract three statistics for
each residual time series: mean, standard deviation and 95th
percentile, totaling nine features.
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Fig. 5. Summarized time series for each cluster
C. Anomaly clustering
1) Clustering results: We use K-Means for clustering the
residuals due to its simplicity and interpretability. To select
the number of clusters, we use the Elbow Method [4]. Five
clusters are chosen. Before clustering the data we apply the
z-score normalization to avoid that any feature dominates the
analysis due to scaling.
To investigate the meaning of each cluster we summarize all
time series assigned to each cluster considering three metrics:
latency, loss and amount of missing samples. To evaluate
the latency per cluster we apply a normalization obtained by
subtracting out the lowest value from each daily time series in
order to infer packet queuing times during congestion periods.
Figures 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) show the summaries obtained
for each metric in all clusters. In summary, users of cluster C1
experience good quality of service (low latency, low loss, low
unavailability). Cluster C2 contains time series with moderate
losses but low unavailability and low latency. Cluster C3
contains time series with high latency and moderate losses.
The time series of cluster C4 are from users that experience
high unavailability periods, while cluster C5 contains time
series with both high unavailability and loss rates. Note that
we cluster UD pairs, i.e., daily measurement time series of
different users. Therefore, a user can be assigned to different
clusters at different days, as we show in the next section.
2) Spatial correlation: To identify periods experiencing
performance degradation affecting multiple geographically
“close” users, we spatially correlate the clustering results
and ISP topology information. The spatio-temporal correlation
algorithm assumes that the routes between home-routers and
the measurement server are static during each measurement
interval. Consequently, the network topology can be repre-
sented by a tree structure at each measurement interval. We
expect clients that share the same ISP network paths should
exhibit similar performance inside the ISP network in terms
of congestion and failures. We analyze the fraction of users
assigned to each cluster at each day of the dataset.
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Fig. 6. Spatial correlation example
We exemplify the results of the spatial correlation for a
specific region of the network. Similar results are obtained for
other network regions. Figure 6 shows the daily fraction of UD
pairs per cluster. Usually the majority of users are associated
with cluster C1 and few losses are observed. However a large
number of users are associated with cluster C4 at day 10, when
multiple time series have missing samples between 1 P.M. and
5 P.M. Another type of event detected by the spatial correlation
occurs on day 17, when periods with missing samples between
6 A.M. and 8 A.M. and high losses between 7 P.M. and 9 P.M.
were observed and several users are assigned to cluster C5.
The framework results can summarize the quality of each
network region based on the number of UD pairs assigned
to the cluster representing good performance (cluster C1).
Figure 7 presents the clustering results in two different portions
of the network. It can be seen that one region consistently
presents a high fraction of users associated with better per-
formance (Figure 7(a)), although performance degradation
periods can be identified on days 10 and 33. At the same
time, Figure 7(b) shows a region where no users are assigned
to cluster C1.
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Fig. 7. Summary of network performance obtained from residual clustering
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a method based on tensor decom-
position to detect network anomalies. We apply the PARAFAC
method and extract the residuals obtained by the model in
order to detect abnormal behavior. We also propose a new
online tensor decomposition method that efficiently extracts
the normal subspace and detects anomalies with good per-
formance. We show the flexibility of our method, using two
different applications as examples. First, we consider DDoS
attack detection using supervised techniques. The results show
that we can obtain high values for Detection Accuracy and
Precision using different classifiers. Besides, our method has
better performance and robustness when compared to PCA.
Then, we use the proposed methodology to identify periods
of network performance degradation through an unsupervised
approach. The method is able to identify periods of degra-
dation affecting several customers and identify QoS related
problems on different parts of an ISP’s topology.
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